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NASA CONJUNCTION ASSESSMENT RISK ANALYSIS UPDATED 
REQUIREMENTS ARCHITECTURE 
Lauri K. Newman,* Alinda K. Mashiku,† Matthew D. Hejduk,‡ and Megan R. 
Johnson§, Joseph D. Rosa** 
The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) program has been 
performing routine on-orbit satellite conjunction risk analysis for unmanned 
NASA spacecraft since 2005, and has developed a robust operations procedure 
and set of recommended best practices for operational conjunction assessment.  
However, a number of recent developments in Space Situational Awareness and 
commercial space operations conduct, such as the immanent deployment of much 
more sensitive space sensing systems and the launching of much larger satellite 
constellations, have begun to challenge these standard collision risk parameters 
and calculations.  In response CARA has pursued a multi-year evaluation initia-
tive to re-examine risk assessment algorithms and techniques, to develop needed 
improvements, and to assemble analysis-based operational requirements.  This 
paper gives an overview of the principal parts of the Conjunction Assessment 
(CA) risk assessment process used at CARA, outlines the technical challenges 
that each part presents, surveys the possible solutions, and then indicates which 
particular solution is being recommended for NASA. 
INTRODUCTION 
The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) program was initiated in January of 2005 to 
protect the Agency’s unmanned missions from collision with on-orbit objects.  The NASA Human Space-
flight (HSF) program, historically supporting missions such as the Space Shuttle, the International Space 
Station (ISS), and ISS visiting vehicles, had worked with the Department of Defense in the 1980s to develop 
the high accuracy space object catalog and CA screening products that would eventually develop into the 
Conjunction Data Message (CDM) and other standard formats in use today.  In 2004, CARA was created 
and, using the basis of the HSF CA process and modifying it to apply to a wider range of orbit regimes and 
types of vehicles, developed a process that is now required for all non-HSF operational Agency assets.  
CARA currently supports about 70 spacecraft using the institutional risk assessment process described herein. 
However, a number of recent developments in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and commercial space 
operations conduct have begun to challenge these standard collision risk parameters and calculations.  These 
developments include the imminent deployment to operations of the Space Fence Radar, an Air Force sensor 
that is expected to change the sensitivity of the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) from the current detection 
capability of 10 cm in LEO to 5 cm, as well as the launch of many large constellations (100s to 1000s of 
members each) to various low Earth altitudes.  Both of these developments will increase the workload of 
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analyzing and mitigating close approach events, making improvements to the existing process necessary.  
Improvements such as decreasing the uncertainty in the relevant computations and the inclusion of more 
automated processes are necessary to adapt CARA to handle the evolving space environment.  Therefore, 
CARA has pursued a multi-year evaluation initiative to re-examine risk assessment algorithms and tech-
niques, to develop needed improvements, and to assemble analysis-based operational requirements.  This 
paper gives an overview of the CA risk assessment process used at CARA, outlines the technical challenges 
being encountered, surveys the possible solutions, and then indicates which particular solution is being rec-
ommended for NASA.  The paper concludes with an inventory of remaining important open research ques-
tions as well as statements of the operational utility that would be engendered by their solutions. 
CURRENT CARA OPERATIONS PROCESS OVERVIEW 
Conjunction assessment is a three-step process. First, trajectory data for a protected asset is screened 
against the catalog of on-orbit objects to predict close approaches. This catalog is maintained at the 18th 
Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS) at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) in California, and screenings 
for NASA non-HSF assets are performed by the NASA CARA Orbital Safety Analysts (COSAs) co-lo-
cated with 18 SPCS at VAFB.  This step is performed two times per day for spacecraft in highly eccentric 
orbits (HEO) and geosynchronous (GEO) orbit regimes, and 3 times per day for spacecraft in low earth or-
bit (LEO).  Second, risk assessment is performed on the screening results.  CARA has an operations team 
located at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) who perform this function for NASA non-HSF pro-
tected assets. CARA has an automated process to ingest the screening data results and parse them into re-
ports sent out to customers along with analysis of the results. CARA Operators also use offline tools to 
manually evaluate and perform additional analysis on close approaches that are deemed risky, dubbed 
“High Interest Events” (HIEs), or have characteristics that require further scrutiny.  In step three, mitigation 
actions are taken by the mission owner/operator (O/O) for events that are deemed risky. CARA works 
closely with the O/O, whose job it is to weigh the close approach risk analysis and recommendation from 
CARA against other mission risks and constraints to choose a mitigation approach.  The remaining sections 
of this paper describe step 2, the CARA risk assessment process, in more detail, including the inputs and 
outputs, the software tools used, analysis performed by the COSAs and the CARA Operators, as well as 
proposed improvements to various steps in the process.  An overview of the full operations processes is 
shown in Figure 1, and is further described in the sections that follow.  
 
Figure 1: CARA Operations Processes 
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Input Data 
There are two sets of screening data produced at the 18 SPCS by the COSAs for CARA.  One set uses 
the Owner/Operator (O/O)-provided ephemeris data sent by CARA to VAFB.  The other uses the 18 SPCS 
in-house Astrodynamics Support Workstation (ASW) solution for the protected assets.  The ASW orbit de-
termination (OD) solution is derived from non-cooperative tracking data collected by the Air Force Space 
Surveillance Network (SSN) and does not model maneuvers planned by an O/O. The O/O solution is gener-
ated from tracking data collected by the operator responsible for flying the asset and includes modeled ma-
neuvers planned to occur within the ephemeris timespan as well as tuned covariance data.  Providing ephe-
merides that include planned maneuvers is critical to ensure mission and orbit regime safety, because it ena-
bles the ephemerides to be screened against those of other assets that many also be maneuvering, preventing 
a situation in which two assets maneuver into each other.  Identifying potential collisions due to planned 
maneuvers in advance through the screening process allows operators to communicate with each other to 
avoid these close approaches. It is especially critical for missions using electrical propulsion, differential 
drag, or other methods of continuous thrusting to provide ephemeris files to 18 SPCS, as otherwise other 
operators would not be screened against the true trajectory but only the non-maneuver one from the ASW, 
which would not match the as-flown trajectory.  
Based on screening each of these input sources, the COSAs send various routine data products to CARA 
for further processing and calculation at the CARA Operations Center, including Conjunction Data Messages 
(CDMs), Vector Covariance Messages (VCMs), raw ASW OD data, and object tasking and tracking infor-
mation. The majority of CARA calculations and data analysis use the CDM data, which includes the primary 
and secondary satellite identification numbers (SatIDs) and common names, the event relative miss distance, 
miss components, and velocity. For each object, the ephemeris file name used is provided as well as the 
individual object covariance, Radar Cross Section (RCS), the Energy Dissipation Rate (EDR) and Ballistic 
Coefficient (Bc), and other OD data. CDM files contain state and covariance information for both objects 
involved in a predicted close approach encounter at the time of closest approach (TCA). CDM data is con-
sidered of much greater accuracy than Two Line Element (TLE) data as it uses higher resolution modeling 
of orbital perturbations. Also, TLEs do not contain covariance data, so a probability of collision (Pc) cannot 
be calculated for the encounter. Therefore, TLEs are not recommended for performing CA and are not used 
by CARA. VCM data contains state and covariance information for a single object at the OD Epoch generated 
by the ASW. CARA calculations and analysis performed using this data are discussed later in the paper. 
While the CDM provides more accurate data than the TLE, the data produced is not without issues of 
which users should be aware.  CARA has investigated two of these issues related to the individual object 
covariance: the potential for non-Gaussian covariance in the Cartesian coordinate frame and/or potential 
cross-correlation error in the primary and secondary covariance. Both of these covariance issues violate as-
sumptions necessary for the standard 2D Pc algorithm used by NASA and most other operators to be valid. 
CARA has investigated the effects of these issues on the CARA process and results.  The potential solutions 
are explored below in the “PROCESS UPDATES” sections Gaussianity of Cartesian-Framed Covariances, 
and Cross-correlation of Error in Pc Computation, respectively. 
Beyond data contained within the CDM and VCM products, the CARA process also utilizes as input the 
raw ASW output data. After completing the daily screenings, the COSAs analyze OD data as solved for by 
the ASW such as the OD arc length, the weighted root mean square (WRMS), the ballistic coefficient (Bc), 
or other solved-for parameters to identify problems and take action to manually improve the OD solution. 
Additionally, they review the OD solution for erroneous data or to identify tracking observations in the da-
tabase that had not been automatically associated with the secondary object in question.  
Further, the CARA process uses tasking and tracking data on the secondary (non-protected) object. The 
DoD has a tasking process to request that SSN sensors task objects and send resulting tracking data back to 
18 SPCS to feed the orbit determination process that allows maintenance of the space object catalog.  The 
process is based on placing objects in categories that determine how much tracking will be collected and the 
priority with which the sensor will attempt to track them.  The CARA Team receives a daily Sensor and 
Tasking File (STF) from the COSAs that provides sensor tracking and tasking information for objects iden-
tified in the daily screening including the current tracking priority level for an object, and whether a request 
has been made by the COSAs to increase the tasking level. Data from the STF is also used to identify potential 
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future tracking opportunities. While no tracking can be guaranteed for an object, tracking predictions can be 
useful to determine a potential Go/No Go time for a planned maneuver such that decision-makers know when 
new tracking data and thus an updated OD solution for a secondary object could be received, hence the best 
time to set the latest possible decision point.   
Finally, primary and secondary object Hard Body Radius (HBR) values are also used as input for an 
accurate Pc calculation. CARA currently adds O/O HBR values to a static secondary value chosen to reflect 
the size of 95% of secondary objects encountered. The analysis section Removing Uncertainty from Pc Cal-
culation discusses improving the primary object contribution. Further system updates are expected to change 
the secondary contribution on an event basis depending on the object type (debris, rocket body, or payload) 
or known object dimensions, if available. 
Automated Data Processing 
Once the daily screening data, namely the CDMs and STF file, are received from the COSAs, the CARA 
Conjunction Assessment System (CAS) automatically begins its processing and calculations in order to pro-
duce output reports containing event information. The Probability of Collision (Pc) is calculated and the 
events are assigned a category.  Events with a Pc greater than 4.4x10-4 are considered “Red” events.  These 
are events that are actively worked by the Operators to ensure the risk is understood and appropriate action 
taken.  Events having a Pc of 1x10-7 or less are considered “Green”, meaning that they don’t pose a threat to 
the protected asset.  The only Green events actively worked by CARA Operators are those in which the 
secondary object is another operational payload.  In those cases, CARA reaches out to the other operator to 
ensure that no maneuvers are planned that could affect the conjunction evolution. Events having a Pc that 
falls between red and green levels are labelled as “yellow” and are monitored for changes in status.  For 
yellow events an additional criteria is examined, that of the quality of the orbit determination.  If the second-
ary is determined to have a low-quality OD solution, the risk may change if the OD is improved. CARA 
works with the COSAs to ensure that all possible actions are taken to improve the OD solution. In some edge 
cases the 2D Pc algorithm cannot be used because the underlying assumptions do not apply. CARA has 
developed a test to determine which close approaches do not permit the use of the standard 2D PC calculation, 
and examines several possible approaches to address the issue as discussed in 2D Pc Limitations section 
below.  
 
Figure 2: CAS Automation Process Flow 
 
There are many other parameters computed during the automated CAS execution.  CAS contains four 
main pieces: a Data Parser, the Automation Manager, a Messaging Queue, and Application Engines. The 
interaction of these pieces can be found in Figure 2 below. Automation begins when new data is received 
from the COSAs and the Data Parser parses and writes the data to a relational database. Once parsed, the 
Automation Manager follows a predefined set of services needed to generate reports and other output data. 
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A service is considered a specific calculation like probability of collision, or action such as report generation 
or distribution. In this way, CAS uses a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) giving the system modularity 
to add, update, or remove services independently of the other software pieces. Further, the Automation Man-
ager is split into tiers which order the services to ensure that any dependencies for a calculation on a previous 
service are met prior to running. Currently, Tier 1 completes all data calculations and Tier 2 uses the resulting 
data to generate plots, make reports, and distribute the final output. The services are run in a specific order 
within the Tiers as described in Figure 2. Services include OD Quality, Probability of Collision, State Com-
pare, Risk Characterization, Report Generation, and Report Distribution. 
 
Each service is called from the Automation Manager via the messaging queue and routed to a workstation 
that is either physical, virtual, or on the cloud to complete the task. Scaling the number of workstations 
used can decrease the overall time needed to run automation.  
Some of the algorithms utilized by the CAS system, such as the 2D Pc algorithm, are being released for 
public use as Software Development Kits (SDKs). SDKs include the source code along with a number of test 
cases.  
Automated Processing: Output Data 
CAS automation produces three main output products.  The Risk Characterization Report is used inter-
nally by the CARA Team to analyze close approaches to determine which may requiring further examination 
or improvements to the OD solution for the secondary. A COSA Worklist report is also produced that rank 
orders the predicted close approaches by red/yellow/green category, and within those by quality of the OD 
solution. This report is sent back to the COSAs at VAFB to enable them to focus limited resources on im-
proving those OD solutions that could be most helpful for events that are of high concern.  Finally, CA 
Summary Reports are sent to missions with the latest information on close approaches that the missions are 
currently considering mitigation for.  This report both displays data taken directly from the input files as well 
as shows results of calculations performed as part of the CAS services. Figure 3a shows the summary data 
included in the report.  Note that screening data is provided for both the ASW and O/O solutions, and that 
the Pc for each many differ based on whether a maneuver is present in the O/O ephemeris.  Figure 3b shows 
an excerpt from the Summary Report details section that is described further in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 3a: Sample CA Summary Report Data Note that the ASW solution is yellow while the O/O is 
red. This is due to propagation and covariance differences in the ASW and O/O solutions. 
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Figure 4b: Sample Report Plots Top Left:  2D Conjunction Plane Plot; Top Right:  Radial, In-Track, 
Cross-Track (RIC) Miss Component and 1-Sigma Uncertainty Time History Plot; Bottom left:  Pc Time 
History Plot; Bottom right:  Miss Distance Time History Plot. 
The 2D Conjunction Plane shows the relationship between the miss distance, uncertainties, and Pc for 
an event. The X-axis is the relative position vector and the Y-axis is the relative out-of-plane component. 
The velocity direction for the event would be the Z-axis for a 3D plot of the event. Additionally, the 1, √2, 
and 3-sigma covariance ellipses are displayed as projected into the 2D plane with the HBR encapsulating 
the primary and secondary objects placed at the miss distance and identified by the blue arrow. As TCA 
approaches and new tracking is received for the two objects, the covariance ellipse tends to contract mov-
ing the HBR outside of the 3-sigma ellipse. At this point, the Pc for an event usually begins to drop off rap-
idly. For some events, if no new tracking is received, or the estimated miss distance is particularly small, 
the Pc may remain static until close to or through TCA. Contraction of the 2D projected covariance for an 
event at 6- and 1-day to TCA is shown in Figure 4. 
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The RIC Miss Component Plot with 1-sigma uncertainties in Figure 3b reveals how the Radial, In-
Track, and Cross-Track (RIC) components have evolved throughout the event history. An analyst can use 
this plot to compare the RIC component changes to the 1-sigma component uncertainty to identify unex-
pectedly large changes. If the covariance for an event is large, due to poor secondary OD for a small debris 
object or if the primary object recently maneuvered, it is not unreasonable to see kilometers of in-track po-
sition change. On the other hand, if both objects are well-tracked, a large change outside of the 1 or 2-
sigma uncertainties for the radial component could be a sign of erroneous data and warrants further investi-
gation by the COSAs. 
Last, the Pc and Overall Miss Distance Time History plots are straightforward, showing the evolution 
over time of these values. The Pc Time History Plot indicates the CARA High and Moderate Risk thresh-
olds in Red and Yellow horizontal lines, respectively. Along the vertical axis, planned maneuvers will be 
indicated if reported by the O/O. This can be useful to see how a planned maneuver may affect a particular 
event by increasing or decreasing the Pc. 
In addition to plots, a large amount of data either taken directly from the CDM or derived during the 
automation run is included on the report. This includes individual object information, OD information, and 
event information. All of this information is reviewed by the CARA Operator to understand an event and 
make recommendations to mission O/Os. Examples of the data is shown below in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: 2D Conjunction Plane Evolution The left plot at 6 days to TCA shows the HBR completely 
within the 3-sigma ellipse while at 1 day to TCA in the right plot shows uncertainty contraction and an 
HBR well outside of the 3-sigma ellipse. Over this time period the Pc decreased from high to low Pc. 
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Figure 6: Examples of Event Information, Object Information, and Flags  
Event information such as the latest Pc value, individual object components, 1-sigma uncertainties, rela-
tive velocity, and approach angle are used to understand the current event behavior and identify further anal-
ysis that may be needed. For example, if a low relative velocity is identified, the CARA Operator will know 
to run the Monte Carlo tool, described in the next section.  
The latest Pc value is one of the most important pieces of data that is evaluated by the CARA Operators. 
Currently, three Pc categories exist: Red or High Risk, Yellow or Moderate Risk, and Green or Low Risk. 
Most, but not all additional analysis is dictated by the Pc being in the High Risk category. Moderate and Low 
risk events as determined by the Pc value may require additional analysis based on the flags identified for the 
primary, secondary, or overall event. New Pc threshold analysis explores the collision consequence for an 
event particularly if a collision between the primary and secondary is predicted to create a high or low number 
of debris objects. This new analysis is further described in the Collision Consequence section below. 
Individual object information such as the apogee, perigee, inclination, RCS, EDR, and Bc provide further 
insight into any event. For example, a high EDR (such as 2.46x10-2), indicates that the object is more likely 
to have changes in its predicted state due to atmospheric drag predictions, and so may be subject to large 
changes in predictions between updates. Objects with a high Bc (more sheet-like) and/or at low orbit regimes 
are more likely to have a high EDR. Further, these objects require shorter OD solutions that require a higher 
density of tracking. Understanding this relationship and comparing to the OD information provided, allows 
CARA Operators to make decision as to whether a definitive OD solution or its future propagation, can serve 
as the basis for CA, or if the event is inactionable due to a poor OD solution or other event parameters. 
Also shown are some of the many event and object flags that are identified through the automated process. 
Event flags could indicate that there is a repeating conjunction event where a primary has multiple close 
approaches with the same secondary object. Object flags are specific to a primary or secondary including 
many flags about the OD information; such as the suitability of the OD arc length or if the OD Weighted 
Root Mean Square (WRMS) value is too high, if there are upcoming or recent maneuvers, or if the object is 
tracked by a single station. These flags are evaluated by the CARA team after each screening both by the 
CARA Operators and the COSAs. The COSAs receive the object and event flags via the COSA Worklist that 
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is delivered with each automation run. They will focus on the OD-related flags as well as other OD infor-
mation provided in the Worklist described further below. Similarly, the CARA Operators will use the flags 
to identify additional tools that need to be run as described in the Manual Data Processing section. 
The COSAs review the event and object data via the COSA Worklist that prioritizes events for manual 
OD checks by Pc and their OD Score. The OD score is calculated based on some of the flags described 
previously, and a score less than one indicates that deficiencies in the OD have been identified. Depending 
on the object and its characteristics updates to the OD may or may not be feasible. Nevertheless, the effort of 
the COSAs to improve the object’s OD solutions help improve accuracy and reduce the covariance size for 
an object’s definitive state and orbit prediction. In some cases, these OD checks can lead to changes to the 
overall event solution including significant increases or decreases in Pc. While the automated OD process 
works for a majority of objects, having the COSAs perform manual OD updates is a critical part of the CARA 
Operations process and directly tied to information calculated by the CAS system. 
The data and plots shown here, plus additional information are evaluated for HIEs at each update, nomi-
nally 2-3 times per day. From here, the CARA operator will decide the necessary next steps including which 
manual tools need to be run and when to contact a mission O/O about an event. The manual tools and their 
output are described in the following section.  
Manual Data Processing: Tools and Output 
Using the output report, the CARA Operator will determine which events are considered high interest 
and will need further analysis. The CARA Operator recommendation for a mission to perform a maneuver 
for an HIE is largely based on the event Pc. The use of the Pc and other event data as a basis for CA recom-
mendations was analyzed on a philosophical level as described in the Collision Probability, Possibility, and 
Plausibility section below. Ultimately the mission O/O is responsible for the final maneuver decision as 
operational risks must be considered alongside the conjunction risk. 
Multiple tools can be run for additional information and to determine recommendations including the 
HIE Briefing, Pc vs. HBR, Maneuver Trade Space (MTS), Sensor Coverage, Maneuver Screening Analysis 
(MSA), Space Weather Trade Space (SWTS), and Monte Carlo Pc Calculation. Descriptions of each tool and 
their output can be found below. 
 
HIE Briefing 
Once the CARA Operator has analyzed the event, he will work with the Owner/Operator to determine 
the best course of action. One tool that CARA uses to communicate with the O/O is the HIE Briefing is 
generated by a CARA Operator to provide the mission O/O with more details about an event. A portion of 
the briefing is shown in Figure 6 below. The starting output from the automated HIE Briefing Tool is a 
PowerPoint with default slides and data that are then updated manually to include CARA recommendations 
and supporting offline analysis results. In addition to the plots described in the automated output section 
above, the HIE Briefing will generally also include output from many of the manual tools such as MTS, 
MSA, and SWTS. These are run separately by the analyst and input into the briefing. Any information, plots, 
or data deemed relevant to decision-making for an event will be included in the briefing in addition to any-
thing requested specifically by the mission. 
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Figure 7: Sample HIE Briefing Output. The sample output includes the title page, agenda, executive 
summary and the final summary and recommendation slide. Most of the manual tool output is included. 
One of the most important parts of the HIE Briefing is the CARA Operator Recommendation. In the 
example, the recommendation was to monitor the event only. In other cases, it may be to plan and screen a 
maneuver based on the times and sizes provided or to execute a maneuver that has already been screened and 
deemed safe. As stated previously, the decision to maneuver is made by the mission O/O with the CARA 
Operator providing a recommendation based on the latest CA data available. Other operations conflicts or 
constraints may preclude a mission from maneuvering or drive a more conservative maneuver decision than 
what is recommended by CARA. 
 
Pc vs. HBR 
The Pc vs. HBR tool allows the CARA Operator to evaluate a more accurate Pc value for an event based 
on the size of the secondary object. Because the CAS automation uses a static secondary object contribution, 
some events may have a Pc calculated with an oversized or undersized HBR. This is particularly the case 
when the secondary object is a large payload or rocket body. 
When a mis-sized HBR is identified, generally due to a large secondary object, the CARA Operator will 
run the Pc vs. HBR tool to calculate a series of Pc values based on varying the HBR. Sample output from the 
tool is shown in Figure 7 below. Whether the Pc is higher, lower, or substantially the same as compared to 
the nominal Pc is communicated to the mission O/O. Any new recommendations based on the adjusted Pc 
are also provided. Using variable HBR estimates in the software to more accurately reflect the object size 
and thus minimize inaccuracies in the initially computed Pc would be preferable.  Presently, there are com-
plex challenges for implementation due to the wide array of data formats used by mission that would have to 
be ingested and utilized.  CARA has investigated a number of alternatives and is currently considering mak-
ing software and process updates in this area in anticipation of the higher workload anticipated once Space 
Fence comes online.  Efforts are described in the Removing Uncertainty from the Pc Calculation section. 
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Figure 8: Pc vs. HBR Plot This plot shows that the Pc for the event can vary from 4.4x10-4which is 
considered high risk for a 18.1 m HBR to 2.16x10-5 which is considered moderate risk for a 4 m HBR. The 
more accurate 4 m HBR changes the CARA recommendation from maneuver to monitor. 
 
Maneuver Trade Space (MTS) 
For almost every HIE, the CARA Operator will generate Maneuver Trade Space (MTS) plots for the O/O. 
These plots are a valuable tool in enabling the operator to choose a target mitigation maneuver time that 
meets mission requirements and constraints while sufficiently mitigating the maneuver.  Without this tool, 
missions would choose a maneuver time that was convenient, have the COSAs screen it, then potentially find 
that the chosen maneuver did not fully mitigate the risk and/or caused new conjunctions with other objects. 
Having this tool allows missions to choose a feasible maneuver that they know will mitigate the conjunction 
without wasting valuable time before TCA to iteratively screen multiple maneuver options. The larger the 
delta-v of the predicted maneuver, the more likely new events will be identified post-maneuver. CARA op-
erators recommend leaving enough time during maneuver planning for at least two iterations of maneuver 
development and screening, although generally one is sufficient. 
For missions with chemical propulsion, an MTS plot will look like the output in Figure 8 below. The Y-
Axis gives a range of maneuver start times and the X-Axis a range of maneuver delta-vs. For each pair of 
maneuver time and delta-v, a new event Pc is calculated by applying those maneuver parameters to the no-
burn solution of the primary. The plot contour coloring corresponds to the resulting post-maneuver Pc value 
using a log scale ranging from a Pc of 1x10-10 to 1. Pcs below 1x10-10 are considered to be 0 for the purposes 
of risk mitigation. The nominal no-burn Pc can be found along the y-axis because that is where the delta-v 
magnitude is 0. CARA has historically made a conservative post-maneuver remediation Pc recommendation 
of 1x10-10 based on previous analysis. This value has been known to be overly conservative, so new remedi-
ation thresholds have been developed through recent analysis as described in the Remediation Threshold 
section below. 
In the example in Figure 8, a delta-v of 3 cm/s is predicted to fully mitigate for a series of maneuver times 
from 12 hours to TCA through TCA. These ideal maneuvers occur about once per orbit at TCA – (N + ½) 
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orbit, a location that enables a maximum radial separation at TCA. Additional in-track separation is accumu-
lated, but this will occur over many hours to days, rather than nearly instantaneously for the radial separation 
increase.  
 
Figure 9: MTS Output. Recommended maneuvers are highlighted manually by the CARA Operator.  
Each mission supported by CARA has different maximum, minimum, and average delta-v values, as well 
as the ability to perform maneuvers in different directions. This information is taken into consideration by 
the CARA Operators when running MTS so as to provide the most useful output to the mission. The tool can 
also be run to look at maneuver sensitivity for a planned Station Keeping or Orbit Raise maneuver. In this 
mode, the Operator can see if a change in the time or size of a nominally planned maneuver can mitigate an 
upcoming event. Screening a planned maneuver prior to its execution is always required to ensure no new 
high risk events outside of the current screening volume are identified.   
In addition to considering maneuvers that mitigate the HIE, all other events received within the screening 
volume are analyzed. This allows the recommended maneuver to be adjusted as needed based on the effects 
of other events. In some cases, the ideal maneuver for the HIE will introduce a new high risk event, as shown 
in Figure 9.  The numerical values are not important, but the Pc contours clearly show an example of this 
issue.  The plot on the left shows that for the primary event of concern, a maneuver size of about 4.5 cm/s 
provides sufficient mitigation, however the plot on the top right shows that this  maneuver significantly in-
creases the Pc with another event post-maneuver. The bottom plot shows the overall effect of increasing the 
maneuver size to about 9 cm/s to avoid both objects.  
The MTS plot can be generated for differential drag or electric propulsion missions given a known change 
in the Bc or the amount of constant thrust, respectively. Maneuvers of this type generally require more time 
for full mitigation and will need to be performed early in order to accumulate in-track separation over time. 
In general, chemical propulsion, particularly if available in the retrograde and posigrade directions is the most 
flexible for CA risk mitigation. 
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Figure 9: MTS Output for multiple events. 
 
Once a mission plans a Risk Mitigation Maneuver (RMM) based on the MTS times and sizes recom-
mended by CARA, they will produce one or more ephemerides modeling the planned maneuver. Often mul-
tiple times and sizes are analyzed to improve the likelihood that one of the screened maneuvers is safe, and/or 
to analyze possible hot or cold burns. If all screened maneuvers show post-maneuver events of concern or do 
not fully mitigate the primary event, the mission will attempt to re-plan and rescreen a new set of maneuvers.  
The effects of newly introduced events on the maneuver recommendation is based on their Pc, post-
maneuver time to TCA, and OD Quality. In some cases, there is a risk of needing to perform multiple RMMs 
in close succession if there are limited mitigation options presented. In some cases, a high or moderate risk 
secondary event will decrease in Pc before a subsequent maneuver is needed. 
The example MSA output below in Figure 10 shows the comparison of three maneuvers planned by a 
mission to mitigate an event with the secondary object. The maneuver modeled in the first ephemeris only 
mitigates the Pc for the event to 4.86x10-5 and would not be recommended as it is still too high of a risk and 
may require a second maneuver too soon after the first. Either of the other maneuvers mitigates to 0 and given 
no other post-maneuver events, either would be recommended.  
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Figure 10: MSA Output. Three maneuver options were screened with the latter two mitigating to a 0 
Pc 
 
Sensor Coverage 
 
Figure 11: Sensor Coverage Output. Tracking opportunities from one site is predicted. 
The Sensor Coverage tool is used to identify potential tracking opportunities for a secondary object. 
Knowing when tracking passes might be available enables operators to determine what the latest time is that 
should be used as a decision point for maneuver execution to include the most recent data. Figure 11 shows 
an output example from the tool. In this example, there is one sensor that is predicted to track the secondary 
object with multiple opportunities prior to TCA. In this example, the last set of predicted tracking occurs 
right before TCA (the red vertical line), and would not be received at 18 SPCS prior to TCA, so a decision 
point after the previous pass would have the latest possible data and waiting is not beneficial.  
It is important to note that these are predicted tracking opportunities only, and there is no way to guarantee 
that an object will receive new tracking. There are many barriers to tracking such as sensor visibility, planned 
and unplanned sensor outages, higher priority objects, incorrect sensor radar strength or pointing position for 
acquisition, or in rare cases, miss-tagged observations. When new tracking is received on a secondary, the 
COSAs will receive an Automatic Observation Notification (AON) message. This is a cue for the COSA to 
generate a 1v1, an update that is for a single event primary vs. secondary. In some cases, the new tracking 
can lead to significant changes to the OD solution and event Pc and change the final remediation decision. 
Space Weather Trade Space (SWTS) 
Space Weather events such as Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs) are still poorly understood and hard to 
predict at intervals greater than 3 days. However, atmospheric drag is the largest uncertainty factor in pre-
dicting future trajectories for low earth space objects, so it is important that the modelling used in those 
trajectories is as accurate as possible. The 18 SPCS uses the High Accuracy Satellite Drag Model (HASDM) 
with Jacchia-Bowman 2009 modelling, which applies coefficients to model the atmosphere based on tracking 
behavior of calibration satellites and modelling space weather phenomenon1, 2, 3. CARA has developed a 
Space Weather Trade Space (SWTS) tool to assist operators with understanding how the Pc for a conjunction 
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event could be affected by any mis-modelling present in the trajectory prediction due to the poorly understood 
phenomena.   
The tool runs a series of Pc calculations after varying the primary and secondary Bc values and propagat-
ing to TCA. The Bc value acts as a proxy to the atmospheric density as they are multiplicative in their effects 
on an object’s acceleration. This produces a trade space of values around the nominal Pc. If there is high 
sensitivity to atmospheric changes and on-going solar activity is identified, confidence may be decreased in 
the current Pc. Alternatively, if there is low sensitivity during solar activity, a greater confidence can be 
placed in the Pc. 
SWTS plots are classified as “At Peak”, “Off Peak”, and “Flat”. An “At Peak” plot will have atmospheric 
miss-modeling that is predicted to decrease the Pc from the nominal value. “Off Peak” events have the po-
tential for increased risk with a higher Pc predicted due to miss-modeling. Both “At Peak” and “Off Peak” 
outputs represent sensitivity to miss-modeling. On the other hand, “Flat” output for an event indicates that 
miss-modeling is not expected to significantly change the Pc and thus sensitivity is low. Examples of varying 
event sensitivity to changing atmospheric drag can be seen in the various plots in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 2: SWTS Output Examples. The top plot described the SWTS plot for event where the primary 
and secondary are about equally sensitive to changes in drag and the current Pc is “At Peak”. Below from 
left to right you have a highly sensitive secondary object and “At Peak” Pc, a sensitive primary and sec-
ondary “Off Peak”, and insensitive primary and secondary “Flat” plot. 
Monte Carlo Pc Calculation 
The Monte Carlo Pc Calculation is needed to produce an accurate Pc when the underlying 2D Pc assump-
tions fail. These assumptions are identified in the 2D Pc Limitations section below. A common reason to run 
Monte Carlo is when an event has low relative velocity. In these cases, the assumption that the event occurs 
nearly instantaneously fails. Another reason to run Monte Carlo is for repeating conjunction events where a 
primary has many close approach events with the same secondary over a short time period. This situation is 
further described in the Repeating Conjunctions section below. 
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Once identified, there are two types of the Monte Carlo Pc Calculation can be used. First, based on the 
analysis described in the Faster Monte Carlo section below, a Monte Carlo Pc calculated beginning at TCA 
using the CDM data provides the needed accuracy for the vast majority of CA risk assessment. This “CDM-
mode” Monte Carlo can produce a result in minutes, with faster output the higher the nominal Pc value. This 
is a significant improvement in CPU time over the Brute Force Monte Carlo (BFMC) tool further described 
below. 
For the minority of events that require a more robust calculation, the BFMC tool was developed. The 
main difference in the BFMC tool is the use of the VCM rather than the CDM for the event input data. 
Propagating the initial OD state from epoch provides greater accuracy than performing multiple instances of 
propagation on a CDM, both backwards and forwards in time. To increase the speed of the BFMC, which 
can take hours for high Pc events to days for low Pc or long propagation time events, deploying in a paral-
lelized fashion to the cloud is being explored. 
Output plots, which are similar for both versions of the Monte Carlo Tool, are shown in Figure 13. The 
output shows the nominal Monte Carlo Pc, confidence intervals for the Pc (orange band centered on nominal 
solution as defined in Hall4), and a comparison to the 2D Pc. The confidence interval indicates the likelihood 
that the true Pc value lies within the interval provided. More trials are needed to increase the confidence level 
and shrink the confidence interval band. The example in Figure 13 uses more trials to reduce the 99% confi-
dence interval. Typical confidence levels used are 95% or 99%. 
 
Figure 13: Monte Carlo Output. Two output plots are shown here using different numbers of trials. 
The left plot used 3.4E6 trials compared to 1.01E6 trials on the right. The increased number of trials re-
duced the 99% confidence interval. Both show the nominal 2D Pc within the confidence interval. 
PROCESS UPDATES AND SUPPORTING ANLAYSIS 
While the existing CARA process is very robust and has served the Agency well for the past 15 years, 
the rapidly evolving space environment is driving the need for improvements in the process to meet evolving 
needs.  Over the past 1-2 years, CARA has embarked on a rigorous set of analyses to develop solutions to 
aspects of the process that offered opportunities for improvement.  This section describes each of the identi-
fied areas and the chosen solution.  Each area highlighted herein is described fully in a referenced stand-
alone paper. 
Removing Uncertainty from Pc Calculation 
In order to ensure that the number of events is limited to only those that are true threats as much as 
possible, the amount of uncertainty inherent in the Pc computation needs to be well understood, and mini-
mized to the extent reasonable.  One way to do this is to appropriately size the Hard Body Radius (HBR), the 
combined frontal area of the objects involved in the encounter.  Historically, NASA missions have typically 
chosen their HBR in an extremely conservative manner, thus artificially increasing the probability of collision 
and assessed risk of the event.  A recent analysis was performed by Mashiku5 that develops an array of 
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different HBR options (stab in dark, circumscribing sphere, maximum projected area into any plane, actual 
projected area into conjunction plane) and characterizes the differences that these varied approaches visit 
upon the Pc.  NASA plans to implement this range of different HBR approaches into its regular processing 
chain so that, especially for high-interest events, the differences in resultant Pc values driven by different 
HBR choices can be made manifest and help to inform the decision process.  Since Pc varies with the square 
of hard-body radius, changes in the employed HBR can have a substantial impact on the resultant Pc and thus 
overall expected level of conjunction likelihood.   
2D Pc Limitations 
The 2-D Pc computation relies on a number of assumptions, but it is often not clear in any given situation 
whether these assumptions are honored.  An analysis performed by Hall6 developed a test to evaluate the 
reasonability of one of these assumptions:  whether the covariance is sufficiently static over the encounter 
interval that it can be considered essentially constant.  CARA will implement the test to be applied automat-
ically to each predicted close approach to determine whether the assumption inheres for any particular case.  
If it does not, the system will notify a CARA operator that a Monte Carlo Pc calculation will need to be run 
for this particular case. 
Gaussianity of Cartesian-Framed Covariances 
The limitations of the ability of a Cartesian covariance to represent the “true” state uncertainty volume 
can cause misrepresentation and, in some cases, incorrect Pc computations.  An analysis undertaken by 
Lechtenberg7 develops and implements a particular test for the ability of the Cartesian covariance adequately 
to represent a state estimate’s error volume, producing test thresholds for concluding adequate Gaussian be-
havior in Cartesian space and profiling past conjunction histories to establish the severity of the problem.  
CARA will implement these thresholds operationally to test each close approach to ensure that a Cartesian-
based 2-D Pc calculation can be used; if not, the system will notify a CARA operator that a Monte Carlo Pc 
calculation will need to be run for this particular case. 
Faster Monte Carlo 
Because it is dependent on certain assumptions, the 2-D Pc cannot be used ubiquitously; but the main 
alternative, Monte Carlo approaches, can be computationally prohibitive.  An analysis by Hall4 demonstrates 
that for most classes of conjunctions that encounter difficulties with the analytic 2-D Pc calculation, the 
correct Pc can be calculated with Monte Carlo techniques that proceed from the TCA states and covariances, 
rather than the much more computationally demanding approach of proceeding from epoch.  This strain of 
Monte Carlo calculation, which works with the TCA states and covariances but with the state uncertainty 
sampling performed in equinoctial elements, is being integrated with the NASA automated conjunction as-
sessment system so that it can be automatically invoked in those situations in which the 2-D Pc is judged to 
be inadequate and for which Monte Carlo from epoch is not necessary. 
Repeating Conjunctions 
Conjunctions that exhibit low relative velocity often do not have a well-defined TCA and therefore cannot 
be evaluated by the 2-D Pc or Monte Carlo at TCA formularies.  An analysis by Baars8 develops a mode of 
from-epoch Monte Carlo that spans a stated temporal duration (rather than encounter boundaries) and reports 
the accumulated risk.  Profiling of conjunction histories with this capability has helped to establish guidance 
for determining in which situations time-span-based, rather than TCA-based, Monte Carlo Pc calculations 
are advisable.   
Collision Consequence 
Even though risk evaluation is generally conducted as the combination of likelihood and consequence, 
CA operations has nearly entirely focused on the likelihood portion and not the consequence, at least in terms 
of a conjunction’s debris production potential.  This analysis by Lechtenberg9 deploys fragmentation algo-
rithms developed by the NASA ODPO to assess the debris production potential of any given conjunction.  
Such information can be used for triaging multiple conjunctions or setting different remediation requirement 
levels based on the debris production consequence.  NASA is still considering how best to make use of this 
capability; however the analysis was undertaken with the assumption that the additional workload caused by 
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Space Fence and large constellations may make it difficult to analyze each predicted close approach, so the 
consideration of consequence is an additional way that the mitigation options can be narrowed.  CARA in-
tends to provide as part of each conjunction’s analysis an estimate of the expected debris production should 
it result in a collision as a consideration when making risk assessment and mitigation decisions. 
Cross-correlation of Error in Pc Computation 
Most CA risk assessment activities proceed presuming that the errors in the primary and secondary state 
estimates are independent and thus that their two covariances are uncorrelated; combination of covariances 
can thus be accomplished by simple addition.  However, it is known that these covariances actually do contain 
shared errors, especially if these covariances were initially adjusted to compensate for errors expected to be 
encountered in prediction.  An analysis by Casali10 develops a method to identify the shared error and repre-
sent its presentation at TCA, so that the shared elements can be identified and the shared error removed when 
forming the joint covariance.  The USAF plans to place in the remarks field of the CDM primary and sec-
ondary object drag sensitivity vectors to allow a decorrelated joint covariance to be formed, which can then 
be used to calculate a more reliable 2-D Pc. 
Remediation Thresholds 
It is necessary to establish risk assessment parameter thresholds in order to identify high-interest events, 
but these values are often chosen somewhat arbitrarily and cannot point to an analytical basis.  An analysis 
by Hall11 uses a large historical conjunction database to establish relationships among lifetime risk postures 
and individual event remediation thresholds, further considering the role of HBR, satellite orbital lifetime, 
and post-remediation risk level.  These analytical results will be provided to interested owners/operators as 
an aid in setting appropriate high-interest event thresholds for their particular spacecraft. 
Collision Probability, Possibility, Plausibility 
While CA risk assessment has proceeded for years with a well-established set of practices, the formalisms 
that govern these practices have been implicit and not laid out in a philosophical context.  An analysis by 
Hejduk12 establishes the governing principles, fundamental question, and null hypotheses that provide the 
foundation for the NASA CARA risk assessment enterprise.  This supporting philosophical structure aids in 
the proper selection of risk assessment parameters and illuminates proper, defensible, and consistent action 
in response to varied risk assessment situations. 
OPERATIONS DEVOLUTION 
NASA is currently considering instituting a paradigm called “devolution” under which the operations 
portion of CARA could be pushed out to the mission flight operations teams to handle along with their other 
operations work.  CARA would retain the CA technical authority under the Office of the Chief Engineer 
continuing to provide analytical research and development as well as operations support to non-devolved 
missions.  A new NASA Standard will be created that will govern the CA process for the Agency’s unmanned 
missions, providing a framework within which the devolution can occur.  The Agency is currently conducting 
two Pilot Programs over the course of the next two years.  All the necessary requirements and supporting 
processes will be developed and implemented for a few missions during the Pilots.  Upon completion, results 
will be presented to Agency management, who will weigh any additional risk and/or cost against potential 
flexibility/automation offered by the devolution paradigm, and a decision will be made whether to allow 
additional mission to use the devolution framework in the future. 
In support of devolution, CARA will evaluate 3rd party tools to determine whether they meet the Agency’s 
CA needs.  A tool certification plan has been developed that identifies the critical features that must be present 
for a CA tool used by NASA.  These features are listed in Table 1. Test cases are available for each item, and 
the list is expected to evolve over time as the industry changes. 
Item 
Tool 
Feature 
Topical Area 
Non-Maneuvera-
ble Spacecraft 
Requirement 
Maneuverable 
Spacecraft Re-
quirement 
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Table 1:  Identified Tool Features for CA, Both Required  and Optional  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The CARA program follows the life cycle of a spacecraft, from providing analysis during the design 
phase, simulating support in preparation for operations, supporting routine on-orbit operations including as-
cent and descent maneuvers, and assisting with anomaly resolution. During the on-orbit phase, Operational 
activities are accomplished by a combination of the CARA COSAs and the CARA Operators located at 
VAFB.  
The space environment is changing rapidly.  Operators are becoming less traditional, to include even 
elementary schools, so it is important to share lessons learned from those operators who have many years of 
Point 
 Estimate 
of Risk 
T-1.1 Miss-Distance Reporting   
T-1.2 2-D Pc Calculation from ASW data   
T-1.3 Identify and flag when 2-D Pc Cal-
culation from ASW data is Non-
Positive Definite 
  
T-1.4 2-D Pc Calculation from ASW data 
with Covariance Cross-Correlation 
  
T-1.5 Indication of 2-D assumption inad-
equacy 
  
T-1.6 Owner/Operator Ephemeris/Pc 
Calculation  
(HEO,GEO),     
 (LEO) 
 
T-1.7 Identify and flag Missing Covari-
ance for Pc Calculation  
 (or T-1.8)  (or T-1.8) 
T-1.8 Covariance Synthesis Capability (or T-1.7)  (or T-1.7) 
T-1.9 Monte Carlo from TCA: equinoc-
tial frame  
 (or T-1.10) (or T-1.10) 
T-1.10 Position Monte Carlo from Epoch (GEO) (GEO) 
T-1.11 Collision Consequence   
Pc Error 
Analysis 
T-2.1 Covariance mis-sizing sensitivity   (or T-2.2) (or T-2.2) 
T-2.2 Pc Uncertainty: Full consideration 
of all error sources  
  
Predicted 
Situation 
at Deci-
sion Point 
T-3.1 Historical Pc Trending (Event His-
tories) 
  
T-3.2 Space Weather Sensitivity   
T-3.3 Tracking Prediction   
T-3.4 Predictive Pc Trending   
Maneuver 
Planning 
Aids 
T-4.1 MTS: Single Conjunction N/A  
T-4.2 MTS: Multiple Conjunctions N/A  
T-4.3 Maneuver Trade-Space: Execution 
Error 
N/A  
Stress  
Loading 
T-5.1 Loading Performance Test   
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experience in the field to ensure safety of flight and preserve the space environment for future generations.  
The United States, especially the Department of Commerce, is working to develop a Space Traffic Manage-
ment (STM) architecture that is expected to change the CA offerings that are available to spacecraft operators.  
NASA plans to continue to operate using the existing partnership with DoD during this time of change; 
however CARA will continue to evaluate changes to the state of the art and incorporate updates as they are 
determined to meet the Agency needs. 
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